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In the last decade, we have witnessed a signiﬁcant increase in disaster preparedness and crisis communication eﬀorts. This stands
in sharp contrast with paucity of research that deals with the publics comprehension of disaster information and related decision-
making. The objective of this paper is to outline a theoretical and methodological framework for research on lay comprehension of
crisis information. The proposed framework integrates two bodies of research: (1) cognitive science literature on comprehension and
decision-making and (2) studies of the eﬀects of anxiety on performance. The paper reviews selected works and methods from both
ﬁelds, discussing how cognitive perspective could be extended to include emotional factors. We also discuss how further research
integrating the proposed framework with public health communication perspective could: (1) provide insights for developing eﬀec-
tive disaster communication and (2) inform the development of technological support for disaster communication and for education
of lay people and health professionals.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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In the last decade, we have witnessed a growing
awareness of natural (e.g., epidemics) and man-made
(e.g., terrorism) threats to public health. This has lead
to increased disaster preparedness eﬀorts aimed at com-
municating preparedness information to the public,
either directly or via mass media. Guidelines for creating
messages recognize the importance of writing clearly
and persuasively [1,2]. Before individuals can act upon
information in the message, they need to attend to the
message, understand it, and accept it. Comprehension
is crucial because decision-making is ultimately based
not on objective information that exists in the message,1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2005.05.001
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E-mail address: keselman@dbmi.columbia.edu (A. Keselman).but on the mental representation of the information that
is constructed by the recipient.
Bioterrorism and disaster-related information are
likely to come to lay individuals from a variety of sourc-
es, from mass media, public health, and government
sources to informal workplace exchanges. As the infor-
mation from all of these sources is understood, remem-
bered and integrated, an individual forms a
representation that will serve as a basis for decisions
and actions. Any program intended to inﬂuence the
lay publics actions and adherence to guidelines during
an epidemic could beneﬁt from theories of how lay peo-
ple understand conceptually complex, emotionally laden
information related to potential or immediate threats.
The objective of this paper is to begin outlining a the-
oretical and methodological framework for research on
lay comprehension of crisis information. This
framework is meant to be applied to public health and
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grams. At present, there is a paucity of work that deals
directly with comprehension of disaster information.
This stands in sharp contrast with the wealth of general
comprehension literature and with behavioral studies of
the eﬀects of anxiety on cognitive performance. We sug-
gest a framework that would draw on these two bodies
of research and integrate them with public health com-
munication, and we argue that such a framework could:
(1) provide insights for developing eﬀective disaster
communication and (2) inform the development of
disaster communication and educational technology
for lay people and health professionals. This paper is
not meant as a comprehensive literature review. Our
goal is to outline and relate several research areas that
we consider relevant to a more broadly based research
program on disaster communication. In doing so, we
emphasize cognitive literature on how lay individuals
create mental representations of information, because
we believe that these mental representations provide
informational basis for decisions and actions.
In this paper, we ﬁrst provide an overview of crisis
and emergency communication, and establish the need
for integrating cognitive theories of comprehension into
this existing literature. Second, we review studies of indi-
viduals comprehension of medical and health informa-
tion, which provide the basis for developing research
to address this need. Next, we discuss emotional aspects
of exposure to disaster and disaster coverage. We also
highlight theories that may help us address the impact
of fear and anxiety on comprehension. We argue that
in order to be useful for the study of response to bioter-
rorism coverage, current theories of comprehension
need to consider emotional factors. Finally, we discuss
practical suggestions for using methodological perspec-
tives outlined in this paper within the context of a re-
search program.2. Disaster coverage and emergency communication by
public health and media sources
Meeting the publics information needs and providing
timely support is vital in crisis situations. Emergency
communications may counter some of the damaging ef-
fects of disasters and help individuals and communities
return to a normal way of life [1]. During emergencies,
the public is likely to receive information from a variety
of sources, which can be divided into two major catego-
ries: (1) oﬃcial/public health sources and (2) private
media sources. Although both types of sources are ulti-
mately concerned with facilitating stability, their speciﬁc
objectives are somewhat diﬀerent. Members of the news
media are likely to describe their goal as providing
‘‘timely, accurate and abundant information’’ [3]. How-
ever, providing timely, accurate information is not theonly concern of the media at the time of crisis. In a
world of severe competition, media organizations are
also interested in boosting popularity ratings, and so
may favor shocking or sensational information [4]. Pub-
lic health organizations, on the other hand, are not con-
cerned with popularity and often deﬁne speciﬁc action
objectives related to their mission, such as communicat-
ing risks, informing the public about what is being done
to contain the disaster, and telling individuals what they
can do to protect themselves [1,2].
During the last decade, both public health and news
media organizations have been faced with the growing
need to train their professionals in eﬀective crisis com-
munication and disaster coverage. They have developed
guidelines, workshops and training curricula to help
professionals present information in an accurate, eﬀec-
tive, and memorable manner [5]. The goal of disaster
communication is to facilitate compliance with protec-
tive measures and to foster psychological resilience. In
the rest of this section, we provide an overview of some
of the guidelines and the principles behind disaster com-
munication and coverage. We also identify the areas
where cognitive theory could provide a foundation for
enriching these guidelines.
2.1. Disaster coverage by media sources
Journalists working in areas aﬀected by disaster face
the challenge of providing needed coverage while
respecting victims privacy and rescue workers priori-
ties, as well as dealing with their own traumatic stress
[6]. In recent years, schools of journalism and journal-
ists organizations have developed disaster coverage
guidelines. These guidelines are based on research on
traumatic stress and ﬁrst-hand experience with disaster
coverage. For example, the Dart Center for Journalism
and Trauma, an organization dedicated to supporting
journalists covering traumatic events, issued the guide
‘‘Tragedies and Journalists’’ [7]. This guide focuses on
news sensitivity issues (e.g., avoiding showing overly
graphic images). It also provides information about psy-
chological response to stress and recommendations
about precautions.
The work done by organizations such as the Dart
Center is invaluable to the profession. However, the is-
sue of the publics possible misunderstanding of the cov-
erage is not addressed in journalism guidelines. This
may be based on the implicit assumption that since
journalists are professional writers, comprehension of
their products should be a relatively simple matter. We
will draw upon cognitive research in comprehension
and news analysis to show that the issue of lay compre-
hension of media news, especially comprehension of
emotionally diﬃcult information, is less than straight-
forward, even when news outlets do not emphasize
shock value in an attempt to raise ratings.
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Like the media, public health has also been concerned
with providing support to professionals who communi-
cate with the public during disasters. A number of public
health organizations, including Center for Disease Con-
trol (CDC) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA), developed guide-
lines for crisis communication [1,2,8]. These guidelines
are typically based on communication theories, mental
health and behavior change research, and experience
with real crises [1]. Communication theories typically
characterize messages in terms of four components:
source, message, channel and receiver (e.g., [9]). As the
emphasis of this paper is on content comprehension,
we will focus on the guidelines for the message itself.
The importance of the message content and presenta-
tion is widely recognized in the ﬁeld of public health [10].
For example, SAMHSA guidelines [2] explicitly state
that the message ‘‘should be delivered with brevity, clar-
ity, eﬀectiveness’’ (p.13). Public health documents also
suggest speciﬁc techniques for making messages more
eﬀective. Both CDC and SAMHSA guidelines suggest
that in the confusion of a crisis situation, individuals
may have diﬃculty focusing on the technical aspects of
information [1,2]. Directions about measures to be tak-
en, therefore, need to be repeated in short, simple sen-
tences. Other recommendations have to do with
understanding unique information needs of diﬀerent
audiences (e.g., individuals in the immediate disaster
area vs. general public) and addressing them accordingly
(e.g., [1]).
Much of the public health knowledge about disaster
communication originates in the ﬁeld of risk communi-
cation, which provides a wealth of information on the
diﬀerence between professional and lay risk perception
[11]. For example, lay individuals perceive risks connect-
ed to natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes) as more
acceptable than risks of ‘‘man-made’’ events (e.g., ter-
rorism). Risks that are perceived as voluntary are gener-
ally more acceptable to lay individuals than risks
perceived as imposed, and habitual risks are more
acceptable than exotic ones. Common techniques for
communicating risks to the public involve addressing
these characteristics of risk perception; a message may
compare risk of a new viral disease (exotic and thus per-
ceived as high) to the risk of driving a car (habitual, and
thus perceived as acceptable) and state that statistically,
these risks are equal. The methodological paradigm of
classic studies that underlie public health disaster com-
munication involves asking individuals to provide their
risk estimates for various events, or to rank-order events
on the basis of their ‘‘riskiness’’ [11]. Participants esti-
mates are then evaluated against the gold standard (ex-
pert estimates or event statistics). Although these studies
provide valuable insights into lay individuals biases indealing with probabilistic information, they do not ad-
dress the role of conceptual and contextual factors in
evaluating crisis information. Traditional risk communi-
cation studies also provide no insight as to how deci-
sion-makers arrive at their decisions.
The risk communication ﬁelds growing recognition
of the importance of decision processes led to the devel-
opment of innovative research methods. One such meth-
od involves in-depth risk perception interviews. The
interview data are used to develop lay and professional
mental models of various risky events [12]. The discrep-
ancy between these models identiﬁes misconceptions
and gaps in lay understanding of risks, which can then
be addressed in communication. Although this ap-
proach does not explore why people may have particular
misconceptions, its emphasis on modeling rich qualita-
tive data is comparable to what we propose in this pa-
per. To the best of our knowledge, this approach has
not been used in developing disaster communication
guidelines.
Summarizing the section on media and public health
guidelines for constructing crisis messages, we would
like to answer two questions: (1) what is presently
known about ways to facilitate message comprehension
and (2) what can be usefully added to that knowledge.
Much is known about providing information in a sensi-
tive manner, targeting needs of speciﬁc audiences,
addressing uncertainty and explaining known risks.
What we believe to be missing is a theory that includes
cognitive and contextual factors explaining how individ-
uals construct representation of disaster information.
Existing theories relating risk perception and risk com-
munication are based on studies conducted in somewhat
artiﬁcial experimental settings. We call for applying
qualitative methods to explore the following research
questions:
1. How does general knowledge of the world, disasters
and infectious diseases inﬂuence the way representa-
tions are constructed?
2. How is information from multiple sources combined
and integrated?
3. What aspects of rich and complex media coverage are
most likely to be remembered?
4. How do individuals resolve contradictions among
messages?
5. How do individuals use information to reason about
various hypothetical events (e.g., what types of terror-
ist actions are most likely?).
Having a theoretical foundation that could address
these issues would be a very useful addition to the cur-
rent knowledge of what it means to provide informa-
tion with clarity and eﬀectiveness. We believe that the
cognitive and social sciences can provide theories and
methods for addressing some of these issues. The rest
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discusses how they would need to be extended to ac-
count for issues of disaster and bioterrorism
communication.3. How well do lay people comprehend health messages?
The goal of health communication is delivering mes-
sages that are clear and persuasive, but readers often
misunderstand health messages. Comprehension prob-
lems manifest themselves across a variety of communi-
cation topics, from following pharmaceutical
instructions [13] to understanding informed consent
information [14]. For example, studies suggest that
approximately 30% of participants in oncology clinical
trials believe that the treatment they receive has already
been shown to be the best type of treatment for their dis-
ease [15]. Patients also have diﬃculty understanding
random assignment [14]. These diﬃculties are often
viewed as a function of inappropriately diﬃcult read-
ability level of patient education materials [16]. Read-
ability is the measure of text complexity, typically
expressed via the average number of syllables per word
and the average number of words per sentence [17].
The readability perspective emphasizes the role of text
characteristics in comprehension. The methodology of
studies conducted from this perspective involves extract-
ing representative excerpts from patient education mate-
rials, applying a readability measure to them, and
deriving a text readability score (e.g., [16]). The score
is often expressed as a number of years of schooling re-
quired for comprehension. The assumption behind the
readability approach is that once the text is adjusted
so that the patient is at ease with its vocabulary and
grammatical constructions, adequate comprehension
should follow.
The focus of our cognitive approach is on the individ-
ual and his or her interaction with the text, rather than
on text characteristics. This framework suggests that
while unfamiliar words and syntactic structures present
a barrier to meaning construction, text simpliﬁcation
alone does not ensure comprehension. Health communi-
cation materials present a link between two domain
models: the professional model of the writer and the
lay model of the reader. The writer typically has extend-
ed knowledge of the situation and of underlying facts,
concepts and processes, which (s)he attempts to commu-
nicate to the reader. The implicit assumption of the text-
centered approach is that given the appropriate
readability level, the readers will extract from the text
precisely the message intended by the message designers.
The problem with this assumption is that lay individuals
do not approach the task of text comprehension as emp-
ty vessels to be ﬁlled. Instead, they bring to the table
their rich, experientially and socially groundedknowledge of relevant issues. This background knowl-
edge is frequently very diﬀerent from the professional
background knowledge of the communicators. For
example, Patel, Arocha and Kushniruk [18] studied the
impact of the discrepancy between lay and professional
understanding of health concepts in doctor–patient
communication. They found that while physicians ex-
plain the patient problems in terms of the underlying
pathophysiological knowledge, patients typically ex-
plain it in terms of narrative structures that describe epi-
sodes of illness. As a consequence of such mismatch,
patients may not accept physicians explanations of their
symptoms and may construct alternative explanations.
This may lead to poor adherence to physician-recom-
mended treatment.
A theoretical approach with the emphasis on the indi-
vidual requires an appropriate methodological ap-
proach. The methods used should provide means for
in-depth study of the individuals meaning construction,
as well as the use of the resulting understanding in of
reasoning and decision-making. This approach can be
found in structured qualitative protocol analysis meth-
ods of cognitive science. For example, in the study men-
tioned above, Patel and colleagues captured the
mismatch between lay and professional models of illness
by recording patient–physician dialogues and coding
utterances in terms of temporal description and causal
explanations of problems. In the rest of the paper, we
will describe methods that provide means for in-depth
study of an individuals background knowledge, com-
prehension and related decision-making.4. What is there to misunderstand? (An illustration)
We suggested that the trouble that lay readers have
with disaster messages may be due to the discrepancy
between the message and the readers experientially
and socially based knowledge. The purpose of this
exercise is to illustrate these gaps with a concrete exam-
ple. Below, we present excerpts from CDC-designed
anthrax fact sheet [19] and identify aspects of the mes-
sage where text/reader knowledge discrepancy may
present barrier to comprehension. Our informal analy-
sis follows conventions of the cognitive walkthrough
method that is often used in software usability evalua-
tion [20]. In this method, a team of experts typically
walks through the action sequence of the program,
identifying points where potential users may experience
usability problems. We similarly ‘‘walked through’’ the
message, identifying points where a reader may experi-
ence diﬃculty. We do not imply that the fact sheet in
this example is poorly constructed; the goal of the exer-
cise is to illustrate the role of individual factors in com-
prehension. The fact sheet starts with the deﬁnition of
anthrax.
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Anthrax is a serious disease caused by Bacillus anthracis,
a bacterium that forms spores. A bacterium is a very
small organism made up of one cell. Many bacteria
can cause disease. A spore is a cell that is dormant
(asleep) but may come to life with the right conditions.
Individuals comprehension of this deﬁnition and its
implications is likely to be inﬂuenced by their under-
standing of bacteria. In the lay model of disease, bacteria
are often associated with dirt [21]. Does this mean that
precautions should include staying away from places per-
ceived as ‘‘dirty’’? Would frequent handwashing help?
One also wonders what is meant by the ‘‘right condi-
tions’’ under which anthrax comes to life. Finally, what
are spores, and how are they relevant to the deﬁnition?How do you get it?
Anthrax is not known to spread from one person to
another. [. . .] Humans can become infected with anthrax
by handling products from infected animals or by
breathing in anthrax spores from infected animal prod-
ucts (like wool, for example). People also can become
infected with gastrointestinal anthrax by eating under-
cooked meat from infected animals. [. . .] Anthrax also
can be used as a weapon.
The passage describes one way by which anthrax can-
not be spread (person-to-person), and several ways by
which it can. However, the statement that anthrax ‘‘does
not spread from person to person’’ may be somewhat
diﬃcult to interpret within the lay model of understand-
ing. After all, the passage says that it is possible to be-
come infected by handling products from infected
animals. Analogical reasoning may lead one to think
that it would be similarly dangerous to touch something
that belongs to an infected human. Moreover, readers
with diﬀerent experience with farming and animals
may understand the reference to ‘‘animal products’’
and their ‘‘handling’’ diﬀerently.What are the symptoms?
Inhalation: The ﬁrst symptoms of inhalation anthrax are
like cold or ﬂu symptoms and can include a sore throat,
mild fever and muscle aches. Later symptoms include
cough, chest discomfort, shortness of breath, tiredness
and muscle aches. (Caution: Do not assume that just
because a person has cold or ﬂu symptoms that they
have inhalation anthrax.)
The fact sheet explains the symptoms of inhalation
anthrax, but cautions against automatically interpreting
these symptoms as signs of anthrax. While the statement
accurately reﬂects the situation where anthrax symp-
toms resemble those of a common disease, it is not clear
how to translate this information into action. When
does one assume that she or he may have anthrax, as op-
posed to simple cold or ﬂu?What should I do if I think I have anthrax?
If you are showing symptoms of anthrax infection, call
your health-care provider right away.
The diﬃculty with interpreting this statement is in
relating it to the previous one. Although the direction
recommends a speciﬁc action, deciding on when to fol-
low this action may not be a simple matter. Asking
one to call a health care provider every time (s)he expe-
riences cold symptoms is unreasonable and undesirable.
An individual is likely to decide to contact a health care
provider only when the symptoms are interpreted as a
potential case of anthrax. This interpretation may in-
clude evaluation of the social and political climate,
knowledge about presence or absence of anthrax cases
in the area, and consequent judgment about the likeli-
hood of exposure. Depending on their experiential and
social knowledge, diﬀerent people are likely to make dif-
ferent decisions about when to contact a health care
facility.
As this example shows, there may be many diﬀerent
ways to understand—or misunderstand—a relatively
straightforward message. The understanding that one
constructs is likely to be inﬂuenced by his/her beliefs,
knowledge, and experience. If we want to have greater
inﬂuence over what individuals take away from a disas-
ter communication message, we need to develop better
understanding of how individual meaning is
constructed.5. Comprehension and information representation: A
cognitive perspective
Comprehension is the process of interpreting text
and building its mental representation. Several inﬂuen-
tial theories describe the process of constructing mean-
ing from text (e.g., [22]). Describing details of these
theories is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
one commonality among these theories is the emphasis
on the importance of background knowledge in the
comprehension process. The relationship between ori-
ginal text and mental representation is not simple
one-to-one mapping. As illustrated above, prior
knowledge creates context in which the original text
is interpreted [23]. Not every statement of the original
text is retained in memory. Facts and concepts that
are connected to what is already known are more
likely to be retained. Prior knowledge also provides
a set of assumptions on the basis of which readers
make inferences. This ultimately inﬂuences the struc-
ture and organization of mental representation of the
original text. Moreover, since prior knowledge will dif-
fer from individual to individual, diﬀerent individuals
are likely to create diﬀerent mental representations of
the same information.
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mans construct mental representations of information,
we need to discuss measurable mental units of these
representations. In the ﬁeld of comprehension, mental
representations are conceptualized as sets of proposi-
tions, or units of thoughts that include two concepts
and a relationship that connects them [24]. Proposi-
tions typically correspond to sentence clauses, and are
stored in long-term memory as inter-related hierarchi-
cal networks [25]. Any discourse (e.g., texts, transcribed
verbal protocols) can be partitioned into propositions.
These propositions can then be classiﬁed according
to various coding schemes, and diﬀerent sets of propo-
sitions can be compared with one another. These tech-
niques serve as a foundation for structured qualitative
method of discourse analysis called propositional
analysis [26]. An in-depth discussion of the method
can be found in Patel et al. [27]. Propositional analysis
allows us to study how individuals represent and use
information.6. Mental representations in health and biomedicine
The eﬀect that background knowledge has upon
comprehension and representation building has been
demonstrated in a variety of areas, from science [28]
to history [29]. Of this rich research literature, the works
that bear the most relevance to our task are the ones
focusing on comprehension of health and biomedical
information. We will ﬁrst discuss studies of health
professionals comprehension of clinical texts, and
then turn to discussing lay comprehension of health
information.
6.1. Studies of representation building in medicine
Patel and colleagues have extensively studied the
process by which individuals with diﬀerent levels of
biomedical knowledge construct representations of
clinical texts [30–32]. In a standard experimental pro-
cedure, participants were shown a written description
of a clinical case. After participants (clinicians at dif-
ferent levels of expertise) read the case, they were
asked to write down as much of the case as they
could remember. They were also asked to explain
underlying pathophysiology of the case and provide
a diagnosis. Both the clinical texts and the response
protocols were then broken into propositions, and re-
called propositions were compared with propositions
of the clinical texts. In addition, each recalled propo-
sition was classiﬁed as either actual recall (corre-
sponding to the literal contents of the original) or
inference.
Participants in the studies varied in the level of their
prior knowledge, ranging from novices (e.g., beginningmedical students) and intermediates (e.g., fourth-year
medical students) to experts (clinicians with specialized
knowledge of the problem area). The researchers found
that on recall tasks, experts recall more relevant prop-
ositions and make more relevant inferences than do
novices (e.g., [30]). These ﬁndings demonstrate how de-
spite reading the same source text, individuals with dif-
ferent amount of background knowledge construct
diﬀerent internal representations of the situation, which
then translate into diagnostic reasoning and decision-
making.
6.2. Studies of health representation building by lay people
Like medical students and clinicians, lay individuals
bring their background knowledge about health and
disease to the table when comprehending health infor-
mation. Compared with the knowledge of medical pro-
fessionals and students, lay knowledge is more likely to
contain non-normative concepts that may conﬂict with
the information being presented. Eisemon, Patel and
colleagues [33,34] studied the inﬂuence of indigenous
medical beliefs on Kenyan mothers comprehension of
instructions for oral rehydration therapy (ORT).
ORT is a treatment for diarrheal dehydration, a disease
frequent among children in developing countries. The
therapy involves preparing and administering medicinal
solution. Eisemon et al. asked mothers a series of open-
ended questions about their health beliefs and practic-
es. Mothers then read text with ORT instructions and
answered comprehension questions, some of which re-
quired integrating text information with their overall
health understanding (e.g., Why do you need to boil
water?). Propositional analysis was applied to: (1) be-
liefs and practice interview protocols, (2) ORT instruc-
tions text, and (3) responses to comprehension
questions.
The study found that mothers understanding of
printed ORT instructions depended on their knowl-
edge of biological and environmental causes of diar-
rhea. For example, mothers with more education
were more likely to recall the step that instructed them
to give children boiled water between ORT drinks. Re-
call was enhanced because the step was in agreement
with their understanding of dehydrating eﬀect of diar-
rhea. In contrast, mothers with lower educational lev-
els would often attribute diarrhea to supernatural
causes and poor quality of mothers milk. They also
demonstrated poorer understanding of the instruc-
tions. The study by Eisemon and Patel demonstrates
how propositional analysis of interview protocols al-
lows researchers to uncover sources of accurate and
inaccurate text representations. The connection be-
tween health knowledge representation, reasoning
and decision-making is discussed in the following
section.
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7.1. Decision-making in medicine
This paper is based on the premise that health-related
decision-making often involves deliberate processes, in-
formed by knowledge and mediated by reasoning. The
goal of this section is to illustrate and support that
premise.
Patel and colleagues research on the development of
medical expertise [30–32,35] has demonstrated the role
of knowledge/expertise in reasoning and decision-mak-
ing. While this work conﬁrms common-sense notion
that greater knowledge of the medical domain eventual-
ly leads to more accurate diagnostics, it also demon-
strates that the relationship between expertise and
diagnostic decision-making accuracy is not linear. Gen-
eral research on the nature of expertise suggests that it is
superior knowledge organization rather than a simple
increase in the amount of knowledge that gives experts
an advantage in reasoning and making decisions [36].
Novice and intermediate knowledge may be a collection
of disjointed facts, but expert knowledge is coherent and
organized around key concepts. In the medical domain,
the development of expertise is similarly characterized
by advancement in knowledge organization. Patel et
al. [31] found that intermediates (e.g., ﬁnal year medical
students) typically recall more relevant information than
do experts. Nevertheless, intermediates do not achieve
an expert level of diagnostic skill, because their knowl-
edge is not yet organized into a coherent system, they
cannot yet discriminate between relevant and irrelevant
information, and they cannot necessarily use relevant
information eﬀectively. In contrast, experts operate pri-
marily on highly relevant information, making propor-
tionally lesser use of the irrelevant.
Individuals who have acquired a signiﬁcant amount
of knowledge but have not yet integrated it into a coher-
ent scheme may perform worse than novices do. This
‘‘intermediate eﬀect’’ may have implications for research
on lay understanding of crisis information. The issues
around the potential threat of bioterrorism and public
health disasters are extremely complex, so few lay indi-
viduals are likely to have an expert-level understanding
of them. Instead, they are likely to resemble novices or
intermediates, who may have knowledge but do not
yet have a coherent knowledge structure. Speciﬁcally,
lay individuals may have diﬃculty integrating or apply-
ing their background knowledge eﬀectively. In terms of
information presentation, this would mean that lay indi-
viduals require support in distinguishing most relevant
information in the news coverage of bioterrorism issues.
Studies of medical decision-making provide detailed
characterizations of ways in which understanding medi-
ates clinical reasoning and decision-making. However,
the literature also suggests that there are situations whenknowledge-based reasoning is skipped, and decisions are
based on simpliﬁed rules or ‘‘heuristics.’’ For example,
Elstein and colleagues showed that physicians under-
standing of hormonal replacement therapy did not aﬀect
their decisions about clinical cases [37]. Experts typically
rely on such heuristics as shortcuts when performing un-
der time pressure or in routine situations that involve
extremely familiar automatized actions. However, when
given suﬃcient time in dealing with non-routine prob-
lems, health professionals return to knowledge-based
reasoning. This relationship between urgency, problem
complexity, and knowledge-based reasoning was dem-
onstrated in a telephone triage study by Leprohon and
Patel [38].
With respect to the lay publics decisions in disaster
situations, it is perhaps reasonable to expect that in
some situations, decision-making will involve quick
reactions with little information processing. This may
be especially true for crisis situations that involve imme-
diate physical danger. However, disaster situations are
characterized by phases, with acute phases preceded
and followed by phases in which the danger is less immi-
nent. These situations will be characterized by more
deliberate, knowledge-based decision-making. Addition-
al research is needed before we are able to project how
diﬀerent stages of disaster may aﬀect decision-making
heuristics. It is also important to keep in mind that the
studies outlined in this section describe decision-making
by health professionals. Our goal is to progress toward a
framework for understanding lay response to public
health disasters. There are both similarities and diﬀer-
ences in how professionals and lay people use knowledge
in their decision-making.
7.2. Decision-making by lay people
Like medical students, lay individuals may have diﬃ-
culty integrating and applying their knowledge of health
and disease into a coherent basis for reasoning and deci-
sion-making. In addition, in their use of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge, they may experience other diﬃculties that are
inherent to lay health reasoning and cognition. One of
them is the diﬃculty of integrating scientiﬁc knowledge
with other kinds of knowledge, rooted in culture, tradi-
tion, or everyday experience [39].
When lay people are taught scientiﬁcally based
knowledge (e.g., through formal schooling), they are ex-
posed to a knowledge system where the link to practical,
everyday life is often unclear or tenuous. This may result
in two separate knowledge systems, one scientiﬁc and
one practical, which barely interact with each other.
As a consequence, scientiﬁc knowledge may be ignored
or used opportunistically. Lay people may provide
opportunistic explanations that can change with diﬀer-
ent contexts, resulting in diﬀerent explanation for the
same problem [21,39,40]. Moreover, when reasoning
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are likely to rely on their practical or traditional
knowledge.
As discussed earlier, Kenyan mothers with more
accurate understanding of the causes of diarrhea were
more likely to build an accurate representation of
ORT instructions [34]. These mothers were also more
likely than unschooled mothers to seek medical treat-
ment for their children. However, in the presence of
strong alternative theories, even relatively coherent sci-
entiﬁc understanding may not transfer into practice. Siv-
aramakrishnan and Patel [40] studied Indian mothers
reasoning about major childhood nutritional problems
in rural South India and Canada. Mothers were shown
pictures of children suﬀering from childhood protein
energy malnutrition disorder (PEM). Outward signs of
this childhood disorder (e.g., enlarged belly, slender
arms and legs) common in India are very familiar to
Indian mothers. Women were then interviewed about
their understanding of causes and treatment of PEM.
The data were analyzed via propositional analysis, with
propositions traced to either biomedical knowledge or
traditional models of health in which illnesses are viewed
in terms of imbalance of bodily humors.
This research revealed that in explaining symptoms
and selecting treatment options, all mothers were inﬂu-
enced signiﬁcantly by traditional theories and practices.
Although mothers with formal education made referenc-
es to modern biomedical theories, they often used those
theories inconsistently, weaving scientiﬁc concepts into
indigenous theories in an opportunistic manner. In
explaining what causes childhood nutritional disease,
educated mothers often implicated the same factors as
did mothers without formal education, despite using
modern biomedical terminology. Mothers with formal
education also frequently chose indigenous treatment
methods for their children.
Keselman et al. [21] studied inner-city adolescents
conceptual understanding and critical reasoning in the
context of HIV. The study involved interviewing adoles-
cents about important concepts of HIV biology (e.g.,
viruses, infection, immune system). On the basis of their
answers, students were assigned to one of the three mod-
els of HIV understanding developed by the researchers.
The students also reasoned about the accuracy of sce-
narios that contained myths about HIV. Analysis in-
volved relating students understanding of HIV biology
and their ability to apply that knowledge when rejecting
HIV myths.
The study showed discrepancy between factual
knowledge and conceptual understanding of HIV for
many adolescents. While most participants knew that
HIV was an incurable sexually transmitted disease, they
often lacked understanding of what a virus is, or what
eﬀects HIV has on the immune system. When reasoning
about scenarios, they often relied on experientialanalogies, rather than on known facts about HIV. For
example, one adolescent who had stated that HIV was
incurable, later allowed a possibility that it could be ‘‘ex-
ercised out of the body’’ because he had ‘‘heard of a lady
who exercised her way out of cancer.’’
Research on lay conceptual understanding of health
and disease presents us with situations in which scien-
tiﬁc knowledge mediates action, as well as with situa-
tions when scientiﬁc knowledge is dormant. Though
the situation may seem paradoxical at ﬁrst, conceptual
understanding research provides context for under-
standing this inconsistency. The diﬀerence between
those situations lies not in the amount of knowledge
(breadth), but in the structure and inter-connectedness
of various concepts within the knowledge domain
(depth and organization) [36]. The studies outlined in
this section emphasize the importance of understand-
ing lay health theories and addressing possible discrep-
ancies between these theories and scientiﬁc
explanations. One way of addressing this challenge
may involve bringing educational materials and tech-
nological tools to schools, and integrating their appli-
cations into existing health and science education
curricula. Additional research needs to focus on the
role of knowledge and heuristics in decision-making
in high urgency situations.8. Studies of news comprehension
Although, to our knowledge, there is no research
which deals with the subject of public health disaster
news comprehension, cognitive theory has been applied
to the study of lay comprehension of routine news
[41,42]. A signiﬁcant proportion of these studies focused
on what individuals remember from their news reading
or news watching in natural situations. For example,
Van Dijk [41] selected four articles from the morning is-
sues of Amsterdams four major newspapers; the topics
of the articles covered a range of foreign and domestic
news. Interviews with the participants took place on
the same day. The interviewees were asked if they had
read the newspaper that morning, and if so, what arti-
cles they remembered. Then, they were asked to retell
in their own words as much as they could remember
from those of the four selected articles that they stated
they had read. Retellings were tape-recorded. Analysis
focused on subjects recall of the content (e.g., proposi-
tions) and structure of the articles.
Studies of news recall and comprehension suggest
that only a small proportion of the original news prop-
ositions is retained in long-term memory and incorpo-
rated in internal models of events. For example,
Neuman interviewed TV viewers about their recall of
dinner hour TV news broadcasts [43]. He found that
of an average of 19.8 stories, the viewers were able to
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ferent types of news stories, and for diﬀerent aspects of
the same stories. In most messages, people typically re-
call a few main ideas, while details are poorly under-
stood and forgotten. For newspaper stories, headlines
and lead sentences are remembered much better than de-
tails and elaborations [44]. van Dijk goes so far as to
suggest that with respect to recall, there is no diﬀerence
between reading the headline and lead sentences of the
initial paragraphs and reading the whole news story
([41], p.152). Readers and viewers typically remember
names of places and people best; recall of actual events
is much poorer [45]. Precise numbers are typically not
remembered [41]. These ﬁndings are of concern to us,
since details are important in newscasts and guidelines
for public health disasters. We want the public to
remember step-by-step precaution procedures, which
may include numeric information (e.g., duration of an
incubation period).
With respect to what is remembered vs. what is for-
gotten, studies of news comprehension are largely con-
sistent with general models of recall and adult learning
[46]. These theories suggest that relevance of informa-
tion and frequency with which it was encountered aﬀect
recall. Studies of news comprehension suggest local
news is remembered better than information about for-
eign events, and that tragic or sensational events are
remembered best, while coverage of abstract or distant
issues is easily forgotten. This suggests that information
about public health disasters will receive greater atten-
tion and will be better remembered than routine news
information. However, the information retained may
not be most useful with respect to damage control and
prevention. Memory of tragic and traumatic events
may be high at the expense of lower comprehension of
preparedness information. In addition, emotions and
attitudes are likely to exercise strong inﬂuence on recall
and comprehension of bioterrorism-related events, and
need to be taken into account. Interaction between cog-
nitive and emotional factors is discussed in a separate
section.
Other ﬁndings of news comprehension studies suggest
that news recall highly correlates with individuals previ-
ous knowledge about the topic. Larsen [45] concludes
that recall of news about ‘‘known’’ events is signiﬁcantly
higher than recall of news about ‘‘unknown’’ events
(30% vs. less than 20%). Background knowledge also
plays a signiﬁcant role in individuals delayed recon-
struction of news. Van Dijk [41] asked his subjects to re-
call content of newspaper articles read a month earlier.
Delayed recall was best for predictable information that
could be derived from general knowledge. Overall, de-
layed recall was very poor. Only one-third of the sub-
jects could answer major questions about the articles
after a month since reading them. This would pose a
challenge to attempts to conduct ‘‘preventive’’ disastereducation, as individuals are not likely to memorize
and retain information about abstract threats in their
long-term memory.
Cognitive studies of news comprehension provide us
with valuable insights about possible lay comprehension
of public health disaster and bioterrorism news. Yet, de-
spite a number of potential similarities between routine
and disaster news comprehension, the situations also
have important inherent diﬀerences. Additional research
is needed to describe unique characteristics of lay com-
prehension of public health disaster news. This research
may investigate the impact of the individuals under-
standing of health issues and their emotional involve-
ment with the information on comprehension.
Findings of such studies will provide further insight
for developing eﬀective public health disaster
communication.9. Summary: representation, comprehension, and decision-
making
Studies of comprehension reviewed so far describe
how individuals integrate the information from various
sources to construct mental representations of situa-
tions. These representations are often discrepant from
the information contained in the source text/discourse.
The discrepancy is the result of inaccurate comprehen-
sion or incomplete memory, and resulting representa-
tion of the same information may diﬀer greatly among
individuals. The individual diﬀerences in comprehension
can be attributed to diﬀerences in background knowl-
edge and life experience. Problems with lay understand-
ing have been demonstrated in areas that are likely to
have implications for comprehension of disaster infor-
mation. One such area is media news comprehension,
in which misunderstandings and limited recall seem to
be the rule rather than an exception. Another such area
is health, in which people fail to reconcile formal and
everyday notions about health and disease.
Whether faulty or accurate, mental representations of
situations are likely to mediate decision-making and af-
fect actions. This link between understanding and deci-
sions is especially robust in medium-urgency situations
that allow time for deliberating and weighing the alter-
natives. High-urgency decisions may be made on the ba-
sis of simple rules, without insight into knowledge
structures that underlie them. However, urgency mea-
sures time pressure, rather than the importance of a
decision. High-urgency decisions are those where the ac-
tion is required within seconds or at the most, minutes.
Many decisions that individuals may have to make in
disaster situations are likely to be of medium urgency.
We, therefore, argue that the role of knowledge in disas-
ter response is prominent, and should be treated as an
important research issue.
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comprehension suggests that focusing on text character-
istics (e.g., readability) alone will have limited success in
explaining and controlling comprehension problems.
Cognitive science theories and methods can strengthen
a research program concerned with crisis communica-
tion by emphasizing the role of factors unique to the
individual. However, to suit that purpose better, they
need to be expanded to include emotional factors.10. Cognition under stress
Works cited above provide us with a model of com-
prehension and decision-making under relatively ‘‘nor-
mal’’ circumstances, not characterized by emotional
upheaval. However, public health disasters and bioter-
rorism are events likely to cause emotional trauma.
Emotional distress after exposure to traumatic events
may cause sleep disturbance, loss of concentration, per-
sistent recurrent memories of the events, and feeling
emotionally upset [47]. According to a survey conducted
3–5 days after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center, 90% of the national sample report-
ed some attack-related stress symptoms [48]. The dis-
tress is the strongest during and shortly after the
event, but the psychological eﬀects of disaster may linger
for months afterwards [49]. Moreover, a number of
studies demonstrate a relationship between the amount
of exposure to TV coverage of terrorist acts and psycho-
logical distress [48,50].
Psychological distress may aﬀect cognitive processes
of comprehension, so that an augmented model may
be required. Overview of the psychiatric studies of trau-
ma response suggests that the framework for under-
standing the publics response to disaster information
should integrate comprehension literature with litera-
ture on eﬀects of anxiety and trauma on cognition. Cur-
rently, there are no studies of comprehension of
traumatic information that we are aware of. However,
literature from many domains of psychology (e.g., cog-
nitive, experimental, clinical, personality) provides us
with information about the eﬀect of stress, fear, and
anxiety on several aspects of cognitive performance.
These works may serve as a guide for developing
hypotheses as to ways in which comprehension of disas-
ter information may be aﬀected by stress and anxiety.
They will also provide insights for interventions that
wish to support crisis communication.
10.1. Stress, arousal, and performance
Studies of the eﬀect of stress on cognitive perfor-
mance come from a variety of ﬁelds, which diﬀer in their
methodological approach and deﬁnitions of stress/
stressors. Traditionally, the research of the eﬀect ofstress on performance was conducted within the frame-
work of generalized arousal theory (see [51] for review).
Stress, in this framework, is conceptualized as arousal,
or negative probability of falling asleep [52]. While mod-
erate arousal is beneﬁcial for performance, high degree
of arousal (and stress) has detrimental eﬀects. This rela-
tionship between arousal and performance can be ex-
pressed as an inverted U-curve [53]. Some theorists
account for this relationship by suggesting that arousal
aﬀects breadth of attention [54]. When arousal is low,
attention focus is too broad, distributed over both the
relevant and the irrelevant. When arousal is high, atten-
tion focus is too narrow, so important aspects of a task
may be overlooked. Finally, when arousal level is mod-
erate, the focus is just right.
Although intuitively plausible, the inverted U-curve
relationship only tells part of the story of cognitive per-
formance under stress, as empirical tests suggest that it
does not hold true for all stressors and cognitive per-
formance measures [55,56]. As an alternative to charac-
terizing the eﬀect of any stressor on performance by
referring to a one-dimensional construct of arousal,
Hockey proposed a framework in which diﬀerent types
of stressors aﬀect human performance via diﬀerent
mechanisms [57]. The framework makes a distinction
among various indicators of cognitive performance
(e.g., attention selectivity, speed of responding, short-
term memory capacity). Each individual stressor may
have positive, negative, or neutral eﬀect on each of
the indicators. Hockey outlines the eﬀects of a number
of common stressors on various cognitive indicators,
and suggests that anxiety increases alertness, attention
selectivity, and performance speed, while decreasing
short-term memory capacity (possibly contributing to
errors).
Research studies of the eﬀect of stress on perfor-
mance typically employed traditional laboratory experi-
ments, correlating measures of arousal with measures of
cognitive performance. Measures of cognitive perfor-
mance used in such studies typically focus on decontex-
tualized laboratory tasks of memory, vigilance, and
processing speed, while measures of arousal range from
psychophysiological techniques such as EEG [56] to
behavioral measures such as levels of fatigue or sleep
depravation [58]. Studies conducted in this tradition
provide us with detailed information about the eﬀects
of diﬀerent stressors on a number of measures of cogni-
tive performance. The strength of the experimental psy-
chology approach lies in its ability to tease out eﬀects of
stressors on individual aspects of cognition. At the same
time, the laboratory setting and the artiﬁcial nature of
the tasks they employed warrant caution in generalizing
the ﬁndings to understanding human behavior in disas-
ter situations. In the following section, we review major
theories which speciﬁcally focus on the eﬀect of anxiety
on performance.
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While studies in experimental and organizational psy-
chology typically consider anxiety as one of the items in
the long list of stressors, anxiety constitutes a central
theoretical construct in clinical and personality psychol-
ogy. Theories of anxiety typically distinguish between
two components of anxiety, worry and emotionality
[59]. Emotionality refers to heightened physiological
arousal (as described in the previous section), while wor-
ry refers to recurrent negative thoughts that are part of
anxiety response. Anxiety theories that place priority on
the eﬀect of worry can be categorized as attentional the-
ories, whereas those that prioritize emotionality can be
categorized as arousal theories (for review, see [60]).
Attentional theories focus on the cognitive compo-
nent of emotions. They suggest that task-irrelevant
thoughts that accompany anxiety infringe upon short-
term memory resources, thus impairing cognitive perfor-
mance [60,61]. In some cases, this detrimental eﬀect may
be compensated for by a coping strategy which involves
an eﬀort to minimize unpleasant emotions [62]. Propo-
nents of attentional theories do not deny the existence
of the arousal component of anxiety. However, they
state that the eﬀect of arousal on cognitive performance
is negligent [59], and provide some empirical evidence to
this eﬀect [63,64].
Unlike attentional theories, arousal theories are con-
cerned with the independent eﬀect of emotionality/arous-
al on cognitive performance. Proponents of this
approach contend that despite some limitations, the
concept of general arousal is still useful in explaining
the eﬀect of anxiety on cognition [65]. Experimental tests
of arousal theories suggest that autonomic arousal in-
deed aﬀects cognitive performance independently of
worry [66]. In Revelles theory, the detrimental eﬀect
of worry on cognitive performance is similar to that of
attentional theories (e.g., [61]). The eﬀect of the arousal
component, however, is more complex. Revelle docu-
ments several eﬀects that arousal has upon cognition,
some of which are beneﬁcial, while others are detrimen-
tal [65]. Beneﬁts of arousal include heightened alertness
and increased ability to encode information into long-
term memory [65]. The eﬀect on the short-term memory,
however, is detrimental, so encoded information is not
available for immediate retrieval.
Like the studies described in the previous sections,
studies of the eﬀect of anxiety on performance typically
employ experimental methodology. However, these
experiments are typically done in psychiatric and educa-
tional rather than laboratory settings. As a consequence,
they use performance measures that often cannot make
ﬁne-grained distinction between speciﬁc cognitive as-
pects of performance, but bear closer resemblance to
real-life tasks. For example, a study may involve admin-
istering an anxiety measure to students before and afteran examination, and correlating worry and emotionality
with the examination score [63]. These studies, conduct-
ed outside the laboratory, can provide us with some in-
sight about the eﬀect of anxiety on cognition in real-life
settings. At the same time, the context and level of anx-
iety documented in these studies is likely to be very dif-
ferent from those associated with public health disasters.
10.3. Dangerous environments and performance
Public health disasters are characterized by physical
danger. The best known eﬀect of physical stress on per-
formance is learned helplessness, or marked impairment
in the ability to learn new tasks [67]. Most studies of this
phenomenon, however, are described in the learning lit-
erature involving animal subjects. The concept of
learned helplessness may be of some usefulness for
developing a framework of the publics response to biot-
errorism; however, it should be applied with extreme
caution.
The eﬀect of danger on human cognition has not been
extensively researched, as dangerous environments are
typically inaccessible, chaotic, and present few opportu-
nities for measurement and isolation of variables. Idzi-
kowski and Baddeley [68] reviewed studies of the eﬀect
of fear and dangerous environments on human perfor-
mance. Some of these studies involve ethically problem-
atic procedures in which fear is experimentally induced
[69]. Others study performance in situations that involve
real danger, such as combat or extreme sports [70]. For
example, Reid analyzed the calculation errors in naviga-
tion by bombers during war military operations [71]. He
found that the errors increased signiﬁcantly once the air-
craft crossed the front line and approached targets, and
decreased during the return journey.
Studies of performance in dangerous environments
are designed to show the relationship between increasing
fear and decreasing performance. Many such studies as-
sess fear via physiological measures (e.g., galvanic skin
response). For example, Fenz [72] correlated galvanic
skin response of sports parachutists with their memory
for various types of words. He found that novice jump-
ers memory for neutral words deteriorated as their anx-
iety increased. Other studies use questionnaires to assess
subjective ‘‘feeling afraid’’ component of a fear, suggest-
ing that changes in physiological changes alone are not
suﬃcient indicators of fear. One of the challenges for
this research is low correlation between self-report and
physiological measures of fear and anxiety (see [68] for
details).
Overall, research on human performance in danger-
ous environments may be summarized as follows. Like
anxiety, danger and perceived danger have detrimental
eﬀects on short-term memory and memory retrieval
[72–74]. Studies also document deterioration in visual
recognition of items (numbers) [75], and deterioration
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eﬀect of fear/danger appears to be mediated by exper-
tise, because experience reduces the fear-related detri-
ment in performance. These studies suggest that many
laboratory studies of the eﬀect of anxiety on perfor-
mance indeed generalize to real-life situations. However,
the methodology used in these studies leaves us with
some questions. First of all, the subjects in most of these
studies were military personnel or athletes, not drawn
from the general population. Secondly, many of the cog-
nitive tasks used as outcome measures were rather arti-
ﬁcial, and had little relevance to the danger that the
subjects found themselves in. With respect to lay re-
sponse to disaster coverage, these studies leave us with
many useful hypotheses. Further research is needed to
extend and contextualize the ﬁndings.11. Summary: stress, anxiety, and comprehension
What are the implications of the literature for lay
comprehension of bioterrorism-related information? It
appears that comprehension will be aﬀected by fear
and anxiety, and that the eﬀect will be largely negative.
Anxiety is likely to decrease short-term memory capaci-
ty. From the perspective of cognitive theory of compre-
hension, reduction in short-term memory is likely to
decrease activation of relevant prior-knowledge con-
cepts [23]. This may impact the ability to draw inferenc-
es and lead to distortion of meaning. By reducing
attention selectivity, anxiety may also lead individuals
to focus on only a small subset of the information in
the coverage. Literature on text comprehension suggests
that the focus of attention is likely to be on the sensa-
tional and the catastrophic, possibly at the expense of
prevention information. We can also expect that the
worry component of anxiety will introduce irrelevant/
distracting thoughts, some of which may become inte-
grated into situation model of the news coverage. How-
ever, while we expect that the eﬀect of anxiety on
comprehension will be detrimental, this decline may be
associated with strong, rather than moderate fear and
anxiety. In accordance with arousal theory, moderate
anxiety may increase alertness and have a positive eﬀect
on encoding. The eﬀect of anxiety on comprehension is
likely to be mediated by experience with performing in
similarly stressful circumstances and by personality
and coping strategies. We hope that future research into
this area provides detailed characterization of various
patterns of comprehension of disaster coverage.12. Conclusions and implications
The objective of this paper was to outline some as-
pects of a theoretical and methodological frameworkfor research on lay comprehension of crisis information.
We proposed that the framework should integrate re-
search on comprehension and the eﬀects of stress on
cognition with existing public health crisis communica-
tion perspectives. Comprehension research suggests that
diﬀerent people may understand the same disaster mes-
sage very diﬀerently. Diﬀerences and misunderstandings
will often be related to individual and socio-cultural fac-
tors, such as life experience and general knowledge.
Ensuring accurate comprehension is therefore a chal-
lenge that is likely to persist despite message readability
improvements. In addition to misunderstanding some
aspects of messages, people may fail to remember a sig-
niﬁcant proportion of their content. Structured qualita-
tive methods used in cognitive science allow researchers
to construct models of individuals mental representa-
tions and thought processes. We therefore suggest that
a research program that incorporates these methods
can enrich our understanding of lay response to disas-
ters. The program can be extended to include methods
to capture the emotional factors in such understanding.
Research on the eﬀects of stress on cognition suggests
that worry and anxiety will impair comprehension by
reducing short-term memory capacity and restricting
attentional resources. What is presently missing from
this research is descriptive characterization of processes
by which emotions aﬀect cognitive processes. For exam-
ple, we do not know how the content of worrisome
thoughts mediates comprehension and decision-making.
In addition, little is known about the role of the environ-
ment in mediating the content of worrisome thoughts.
We also do not know what conscious strategies individ-
uals may use to control anxiety in crisis situations.
Conducting a rich descriptive study of the eﬀects of
stress on cognition presents a methodological challenge.
Real-life crisis situations are unexpected and chaotic,
and are therefore diﬃcult to study. Laboratory settings,
on the other hand, may not provide meaningful context
for the study of crisis cognition. We believe that a com-
bination of the two approaches can help address this is-
sue. For example, in-depth interviews about real
situations can be supplemented by discussion of hypo-
thetical scenarios. An example of applying cognitive
methodology to a study of lay response of SARS epi-
demics can be found in Slaughter et al. [77]. Studies con-
ducted within such framework have the potential of
providing valuable, relevant knowledge that can inform
eﬀective disaster communication eﬀorts.Acknowledgments
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